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Proposition 8 and The Exclusionary
Rule: Towards a New Balance of
Defendant and Victim Rights
Grover C. Trask 1* and
Timothy J. Searight**
The amendment of the California Constitution in 1911 to provide for
initiative and referendum signifies one of the outstanding achievements
of the progressive movement of the early 1900's. Drafted in light of the
theory that all power of government ultimately resides in the people, the
Amendment speaks of the initiative and referendum, not as a right
granted the people, but as a power reserved by them.1
Justice Tobriner
"Consistent with our firmly established precedent, we have
jealously guarded this precious right [of initiative and referendum],
giving the initiative's terms a liberal construction...." 2
Justice Richardson on Proposition 8
* District Attorney, Riverside County, Ca.; J.D., University of San Diego, 1975; B.A., San
Diego State University, 1970.
** Deputy District Attorney, Riverside County, Ca.; J.D., University of California, Hastings
College of the Law, 1990; A.B., Columbia University, 1985.
The authors wish to express their thanks to Alan G. Willig, Kay L. Levine, and Libby Liu for
their assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582,591,557 P.2d 473,477,
135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 45 (1976).
2. Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 262, 651 P.2d 274, 289, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 45
(1982).
1101
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 23
INTRODUCTON
On June 8, 1982, California voters went to the polls and
adopted Proposition 8, "The Victims' Bill of Rights," by a vote
of fifty-six percent to forty-four percent.3 In the ten years since its
adoption, Proposition 8, codified as article I, section 28 of the
California Constitution, has had a checkered history in the
California judicial system. The California courts have been
particularly reluctant to rigorously apply section 28(d), which
requires that relevant evidence not be excluded in criminal matters
except to the extent required by federal constitutional law.4
It is the thesis of this Article that, in adopting Proposition 8, a
majority of the voters in California meant to strike a new balance
between the rights of criminal defendants and the rights of victims
of crime in favor of the rights of victims. With regard to the
exclusionary rule, this new balance was to be achieved by
following the dictates of the Supreme Court of the United States.
In the event that the Supreme Court of the United States had not
addressed a particular issue, the California courts were to strike a
balance that favors the rights of victims and disfavors the exclusion
of relevant evidence.
Part I of this Article begins with a review of Proposition 8 and
an examination of the reasons why it was adopted.' The passage
of Proposition 8 through the Supreme Court of California is
examined in Part II, with primary focus on section 28(d). 6 This
section reveals that the Supreme Court of California, particularly
prior to 1986, has applied Proposition 8 with inconsistent results.
The effect of these inconsistencies on the district courts of appeal
3. L.A. Times, June 10, 1982, Part I, at 16, col. 3. See Victims' Bill of Rights, Initiative
Measure Proposition 8 (approved June 8, 1982) (codified at CAL. CONST, art. 1, §§ 12, 28; CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 25, 667, 1191.1, 1192.7, 3043 (West Supp. 1992); CAL. WELl. & INST. CODE §§
1732.5, 1767, 6331 (West Supp. 1992)).
4. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d). See In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d, 873, 886-88, 694 P.2d 744,
752-54, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 639-40 (1985) (discussing the application of section 28(d)).
5. See infra notes 8-36 and accompanying text (discussing Proposition 8 and the reasons for
its adoption).
6. See infra notes 37-136 and accompanying text (discussing the passage of Proposition 8
through the Supreme Court of California).
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is then briefly described. Part I of this Article applies the
Victims' Bill of Rights to two issues that have yet to be addressed
by the Supreme Court of the United States. 7 The first issue
examines the law concerning removal of identification during
detention. The second involves the legal consequences of
unauthorized nighttime service of search warrants. Finally, in Part
IV, the authors conclude that where there is no Supreme Court of
the United States decisional law, California courts should favor the
new balance of defendant and victim rights created by Proposition
8. This new balance between the criminal and the victim requires
that relevant evidence is not to be excluded even where pre-
Proposition 8 case law or the doctrine of "independent state
grounds" might allow such exclusion.
I. PRoPOSITION 8 -- TOWARDS A NEW BALANCE OF
DEFENDANT AND VICTIM RIGHTS
Proposition 8 was entitled "The Victims' Bill of Rights" and
this title is the source for a portion of the title of the article I,
section 28 amendment of the California Constitution.' The
preamble to section 28 states, in part, that "[t]he People of the
State of California find and declare that the enactment of
comprehensive provisions and laws ensuring a bill of rights for
victims of crime, including safeguards in the criminal justice
system to fully protect those rights is a matter of grave statewide
concern." '9 It is further stated in the preamble that "[t]o
accomplish these goals, broad reforms in the procedural treatment
of accused persons and the disposition and sentencing of convicted
persons are necessary and proper as deterrents to criminal behavior
and to serious disruption of people's lives." 10
To accomplish the intended goals, specific changes were made
in several different areas of California law. For example, section
7. See infra notes 137-174 and accompanying text (applying the Victims' Bill of Rights to
two hypotheticals).
8. CAL. CONST. art. , § 28.
9. Id. § 28(a).
10. 1M
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28(d) states that "[r]elevant evidence shall not be excluded in any
criminal proceeding.... Nothing in this section shall affect any
existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay,
or Evidence Code, sections 352, 782 or 1103." ' l The latter part
of this section has become known as the "savings clause" of
section 28(d). 2
Section 28(f) is closely analogous to section 28(d). While
section 28(d) provides that relevant evidence shall not be excluded
in criminal proceedings, section 28(t) further extends the
evidentiary rules to provide that prior felony convictions "shall be
used without limitation for purposes of impeachment or
enhancement of sentence in any criminal proceeding."3
Perhaps the most unusual paragraph of section 28 is paragraph
(b), which provides restitution for crime victims.4 That paragraph,
which immediately follows the preamble, states that "[i]t is the
unequivocal intention of the People of the State of California that
all persons who suffer losses as a result of criminal activity shall
have the right to restitutibn from the persons convicted of the
crimes they suffer. ' 1 5 This paragraph, more than any other,
demonstrates the function of section 28 as a victims' bill of rights.
The legislative analyst's summary of the effect of Proposition
8 on California law was included in the ballot pamphlets
distributed by the registrar of voters. That summary stated, with
regard to section 28(d), that "[u]nder current law, certain evidence
is not permitted to be presented in a criminal trial or hearing....
This measure generally would allow most relevant evidence to be
presented in criminal cases .... The measure could not affect
federal restrictions on the use of evidence.""
The ballot pamphlet included arguments advanced in favor of
the Proposition. It was stated that "[b]y voting 'yes' on the
11. Id. § 28(d).
12. See People v. May, 44 Cal. 3d 309, 315, 748 P.2d 307, 310, 243 Cal. Rptr. 369, 372
(1988) (describing the second clause of section 28(d) as a savings clause).
13. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(0.
14. CAL. CONST. art I, § 28(b).
15. Id § 28(b).
16. Legislative Analyst of California, Analysis in CAL. BALLOT PAMPHLET 32 (June 8, 1982).
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Victims' Bill of Rights you will restore balance to the rules
governing the use of evidence against criminals....,,17 The
pamphlet also provided that "[f]or too long our courts and the
professional politicians in Sacramento have demonstrated more
concern with the rights of criminals than with the rights of innocent
victims," 18 and that crime victims were also "victims of our
criminal justice system -- the liberal reformers, lenient judges and
behavior modification do-gooders... ."19 "[H]igher courts of this
state have created additional rights for the criminally accused and
placed more restrictions on law enforcement officers. This
proposition will overcome some of the adverse decisions by our
higher courts." 20
An examination of the language of section 28 itself, the
Legislative Analysis, and the Arguments in Favor of Proposition 8
indicates that the voters' purpose in enacting Proposition 8 was to
shift the balance between the rights of criminal defendants and
victims. The language of section 28 is strident. It declares that
"broad reforms" are needed and that it is the "unequivocal
intention of the People of the State of California" that victims have
a right to restitution.2
Right or wrong, a majority of the voters22 perceived the
California courts, and in particular the Supreme Court of
California, as over-protective of the rights of criminal defendants
at the expense of the effective prosecution of crime and the rights
17. Il at 34.
18. Id
19. Id. at 35.
20. Id. at 34.
21. CAL. CONST. art I, § 28(a)-(b) (emphasis added).
22. It is beyond the scope of this Article to attempt to define the extent to which the
proposition and election process in fact reflects the will of the "'People of the State of California."
The initiative process has been subject to much criticism. See, e.g., Eule, Checking California's
Plebiscite, 17 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 151 (1989); Eule,Judicial Review of DirectDemocracy, 99 YALE
LJ. 1503 (1990) (criticizing the initiative process). Nevertheless, in a democratic system, the voting
process is that which is believed best able to determine the will of the People. See Associated Home
Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 591,557 P.2d 473, 477, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 45 (1976)
(discussing the initiative process).
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of crime victims.23 This view is clearly illustrated by the events
that transpired following the passage of Proposition 8.
Public opinion of the judiciary after the passage of Proposition
8 is evidenced by the events occurring in 1986 when the
appointments of Chief Justice Bird and Justices Grodin and
Reynoso were not confirmed.2" Bird was the first chief justice in
the court's modem history to be voted off the bench.' One of the
two major groups that opposed Bird's confirmation called itself
"Crime Victims for Court Reform.
' 26
Proposition 115, which may be viewed as the younger sister of
Proposition 8, was adopted in June of 1990.27 The preamble to
Proposition 115 provides: "We the people of the State of
California hereby find that the rights of crime victims are too often
ignored by our courts and by our State Legislature... and that
comprehensive reforms are needed in order to restore balance and
fairness to our criminal justice system." 28
There were, and continue to be, many legal tools available to
California courts that are designed to effectuate the voters' purpose
in adopting Proposition 8.29 First, since initiatives are based
23. The term "rights of victims" is accurate in many cases, but misleading in others. This
point has been noted by other commentators. See, e.g., Note, Proposition 8 and the California
Supreme Court: Interpretation Run Riot?, 60 S. CA. L. REv. 540, 564-65 (1987) ("The [victim's
rights] are more accurately described as the rights of society to protect itself from criminal acts which
work to destroy society."). The authors adopt this statement though we note that in many cases, the
injury caused by criminal defendants to a victim can be very direct.
24. LA. Times, Nov. 5 1986, Part I, at 1, col. 2.
25. l
26. I.
27. L.A. Times, June 6, 1990, at A25, col. 2. The vote for Proposition 115 (fifty-seven percent
to forty-three percent) was virtually identical to that of Proposition 8 (fifty-six percent to forty-four
percent). Id.
28. Text of Proposed Law, Sec. 1, in CAL. BALLOT PA BPHLET 33 (June 5, 1990). See CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 14.1, Note (Deerings Supp. 1992) (setting forth preamble to Proposition 115).
29. Something should be said at this point about "legal realism." This Article and its thesis
emphatically do not employ a reliance on rules of interpretation for the application of Proposition 8.
The only "interpretation" of Proposition 8 by the authors is as follows: That the purpose of the
majority of the voters in enacting Proposition 8 was to strike a new balance between defendant and
victim rights. This point does not appear to be seriously questioned by any judge or commentator.
"Interpretations" of Proposition 8 by the Supreme Court of Califomia have been criticized. Legal
realists have said that the court has been "results oriented" and that it has used rules of
interpretation-the "plain meaning rule," "intentionalism," and the like-to justify holdings based
upon the "moral choices" made by the justices between criminal defendant and victim. See, e.g.,
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directly on the democratic process of voting, they are generally
interpreted broadly in order to effectuate the popular will. In 1978,
for example, when examining Proposition 13, which altered real
property taxation, Justice Richardson, writing for the majority of
the Supreme Court of California, said that
[iut is a fundamental precept of our law that, although the legislative
power under our constitutional framework is firmly vested in the
legislature 'the people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and
referendum.' It follows from this, that [the] power of initiative must be
liberally construed... to promote the democratic process.
30
Similar language has been employed in the context of
evaluating Proposition 8. For example, Justice Richardson, writing
for the Supreme Court of California in Brosnahan v. Brown,31
stated that "[c]onsistent with our firmly established precedent, we
have jealously guarded this precious right [of initiative], giving the
initiative's terms a liberal construction. ' 32 Although proposition
8 has not always been subject to this "liberal construction," the
courts' traditional deference to the initiative power is one method
available to fully effectuate the aim of Proposition 8.
Another available judicial interpretative tool is the primary rule
of statutory construction that constitutional provisions must be
liberally construed so as to give them effect and to achieve the real.
Note, supra, note 23, at 552-54; Moore, A Natural Law Theory ofInterpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv.
277, 322-27 (1985) (discussing and interpreting legal realism).
Rules of interpretation are malleable. Some "moral choice" - to use the legal realist's
terminology - must be made to determine where the balance between victim and defendant rights
should be struck. The thesis here is that the voters' purpose in enacting Proposition 8 was to strike
a balance in favor of crime victims. This purpose is effectuated by leaving the balancing with regard
to the exclusionary rule to the United States Supreme Court. Where the United States Supreme Court
has not addressed an issue, the courts are to favor the admission of relevant evidence. Given that the
purpose of Proposition 8 was to favor the rights of victims, the only remaining question is how to
effectuate that purpose. Answering that question is the goal of this Article.
30. Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d
208,219,583 P.2d 1281,1283,149 Cal. Rptr. 239,241 (1978) (quoting San Diego Bldg. Contractors
Assn. v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 210 n.3, 529 P.2d 570, 572 n.3, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146, 148 n.3
(1974) (brackets in original)).
31. 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982).
32. Id. at 262, 651 P.2d at 289, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
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purpose of their enactment.3 Upon its adoption, Proposition 8
became part of the California Constitution.34 Although no court
appears to have employed this rule of liberal construction to the
provisions of Proposition 8, it is nonetheless another means
available to the judiciary to achieve the desired goals of
Proposition 8.
Proposition 8 is remedial in nature. Not only was it expected to
reverse many decisions of the California courts, it also provided
crime victims with a right of restitution. Court attitudes toward
remedial legislation are well-established. With regard to automobile
financial responsibility laws (laws upon which many criminal
actions are based, particularly "hit-and-run" actions), the Supreme
Court of California has indicated that such laws are remedial in
nature and should be liberally construed.35 Similar rules of
interpretation have been applied to workers' compensation laws and
other laws remedial in nature. 36 Recognizing Proposition 8 as
remedial in nature is yet another way to facilitate the achievement
of its purpose. Thus, it is clear that there are several interpretive
tools available to the California judiciary to effectuate the desired
goals of Proposition 8.
II. PROPOSITION 8 AND SECTION 28(D) IN THE
CALIFORNIA COURTS
California courts have not embraced Proposition 8 to its full
potential. The courts have been particularly reluctant to impose a
33. Cornell v. Harris, 15 Cal. App. 2d 144, 149, 59 P.2d 570, 572 (1936).
34. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d). In a case involving an initiative on voter residency
requirements that, like Proposition 8, became part of the state constitution, a California appellate
court stated that "'[t]he provisions of the Constitution must receive a liberal, practical common-sense
construction.... The object is to give effect to the intent of the people in whom the sovereignty of
the state resides." MeMillan v. Siemon, 36 Cal. App. 2d 721, 726 (1940).
35. Continental Cas. Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 434, 296 P.2d 801, 808
(1956). "'The rule of law in the construction of remedial statutes requires great liberality, and
wherever the meaning is doubtful, it must be construed as to extend the remedy." lad
36. See, e.g., Indus. Welfare Comm'n v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 690, 702, 613 P.2d 579,
585, 166 Cal. Rptr. 331, 337 (1980) (discussing the remedial nature of worker compensation laws);
People ex rel Dept. of Transp. v. Muller, 86 Cal. 3d 263, 269, 681 P.2d 1340, 1344, 203 Cal. Rptr.
772, 776 (1984) (discussing the remedial nature of eminent domain law).
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rigorous application of section 28(d) (perhaps the most
controversial section of Proposition 8) which requires that relevant
evidence not be excluded except to the extent required by the
federal constitution.
Section 28(d) speaks more directly to the balance of defendant
and victim rights than does any other section of Proposition 8.
Because it involves a direct balance of a defendant's rights
pursuant primarily to the fourth, fifth and sixth amendments against
the state's ability to effectively prosecute crime and protect society,
the exclusionary rule is a central issue in the application of
Proposition 8. The courts' reluctance to rigorously apply section
28(d) greatly undermines the purpose of Proposition 8. This section
examines the progress of Proposition 8 through the California
courts, focusing on section 28(d) and the exclusionary rule.
A. Off to a Rough Start
Proposition 8 got off to a rough start. To begin with, it failed
to secure the requisite number of signatures needed to place it on
the ballot. Accordingly, Secretary of State March Fong Eu refused
to place it on the ballot. However, special legislation was passed
to address the discrepancy, and Proposition 8 was ultimately placed
on the ballot.
37
Upon review by the Supreme Court of California, Proposition
8 proved to be divisive. In Brosnahan v. Brown,31 the court
upheld the constitutionality of Proposition 8 over facial challenges
37. See Brosnahan v. Eu, 31 Cal. 3d 1, 13-14, 641 P.2d 200, 207, 181 Cal. Rptr. 100, 107
(1982).
38. 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982).
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by a bare four to three majority.39 In August of 1983, it was held
that Proposition 8 was not to be applied retroactively.4"
The next two and one-half years passed without further
comment from the Supreme Court of California with regard to
Proposition 8. During that time, thousands of criminal cases in
California were left in a state of flux.4 Finally, on January 28 and
February 1 of 1985, the court decided two cases regarding section
28(d).
In the first case, Ramona R. v. Superior Court,42 the court
unanimously held that a juvenile's statements at a hearing under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 relating to the juvenile's
fitness for treatment within juvenile court facilities could not be
used against the juvenile at a trial on the charges. 43 The court
reasoned that since such a hearing was legislatively compelled and
the juvenile was asked to speak with complete candor concerning
the incidents at issue, the prosecution's use of the juvenile's
statements against the juvenile would violate the privilege against
self-incrimination." The court held that use immunity was
required for statements made at the hearing in order to protect the
integrity and usefulness of the section 707 hearing.
45
In reaching its decision, the court interpreted the "savings
clause" of section 28(d).46 While section 28(d) provides that
"[rjelevant evidence shall not be excluded," it also expressly
39. Id. at 262, 651 P.2d at 289, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 45-46. Proposition 8 survived challenges
based upon the "'single-subject rule," -.impairment of essential governmental functions," and
challenges that the Proposition constituted a "constitutional revision" and not an amendment. leL at
245-62, 651 P.2d at 279-89, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 35-46. It was on this last point that Proposition 115,
the younger sister of Proposition 8, faltered. See Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 350-55, 801
P.2d 1077, 1085-89, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326, 334-38 (1990) (concluding that Proposition 115 constituted
an unacceptable constitutional revision).
40. People v. Smith, 34 Cal. 3d 251,258, 667 P.2d 149, 152, 193 Cal. Rptr. 692, 695 (1983).
41. This period of delay has been criticized by criminal law practitioners. See, e.g., Bedsworth,
In re Lance W.: The Ship of State Makes a Course Correction, 13 WEST. S. L. REv. 9, 11 (1985)
(criticizing the Supreme Court of California's delay in addressing the effect of Proposition 8).
42. 37 Cal. 3d 802, 693 P.2d 789, 210 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1985).
43. Id. at 810, 693 P.2d at 795,210 Cal. Rptr. at 210. See CAL. WELt. & INsT. CODE § 707
(West Supp. 1992) (providing for fitness for treatment hearing).
44. Id. at 807-08, 693 P.2d at 792-93, 210 Cal. Rptr. 207-08.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 804, 693 P.2d at 790, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 205. See CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 28(d).
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provides that section 28(d) does not affect "any existing statutory
rule of evidence relating to privilege." 4 7 However, the court
reasoned that federal law was not clear as to whether use immunity
was required with regard to a section 707 hearing.48 The court
instead based its holding on the California privilege against self-
incrimination described in section 940 of the Evidence Code,
reasoning that the privilege against self-incrimination was "saved"
from the operation of section 28(d).4 9
In the second case, In re Lance W., ° the Supreme Court of
California finally came to grips with the exclusionary rule.5 1 Prior
to Lance W., California's exclusionary rule was based upon the
doctrine of "independent state grounds" and was broader than that
which had been enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United
States.52 "Independent state grounds" is the doctrine which
permits a California court to impose higher standards on searches
and seizures than required by the federal constitution and to use its
own exclusionary rule, if the court sees fit, to impose these higher
standards. 3
47. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(d).
48. Ramona R., 37 Cal. 3d at 808-10, 693 P.2d at 793-95, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 208-10.
49. Id. at 808, 639 P.2d at 793, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
50. 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P.2d 744, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1985).
51. Id. at 879, 694 P.2d at 747, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 634. The exclusionary rule mandates the
exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the federal constitution, primarily the fourth, fifth,
sixth, and fourteenth amendments. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (discussing the
exclusionary rule). Once thought to be an essential part of the constitutional rights on which its
operation was based, the exclusionary rule has since been held to be merely a 'judicially created
remedy.'" United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,906 (1984). One court in California has opined that
since the exclusionary rule is only a judicial remedy, section 28(d) might indicate that the
exclusionary rule need not be applied even when based upon a violation of the federal constitution.
See People v. Brewster, 184 Cal. App. 3d 921, 928, 229 Cal. Rptr. 352, 356 (1986) (stating that
"'a]lthough the lack of constitutional compulsion seems to resolve the issue...").
52. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (discussing the doctrine of independent
state grounds).
53. Id. California courts had expanded search and seizure and other protections beyond that
required by the federal constitution in many areas, including the rules on detentions, search warrants,
state action, automobile searches, and other areas. See Allen, Defense Motions After Lance W., 13
WEsT. ST. L. REv. 9,35 (1985); Jenkins and Thomas, People v. Castro: A Road Back to Beagle and
Beyond, 13 WEST. ST. LAW. REV. 9, 27 (1985); Note, Disbrow Confronts Proposition 8: Will
Miranda Violative Statements Be Admitted to Trial for Impeachment?, 17 PAc. LJ. 1337, 1346-47
(1986) (discussing the expected effect of Proposition 8 in the area of search and seizure law).
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Lance W. specifically addressed the so-called "vicarious
standing" rule.54 In Lance W., the police officers observed the
defendant walk up to a car and drop something into the passenger
compartment.55 The officers did not know what it was that the
defendant had dropped.56 The officers opened the door to the car
and found marijuana.57 Under federal law, the marijuana would
have been admissible evidence despite the officers lack of probable
cause to search the vehicle since the defendant could not have had
any objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the automobile
of another and thus did not have "standing."5 " Contrary to
federal law, California's "vicarious standing" rule would have
excluded the evidence in order to "protect the integrity of the
court" from the introduction of illegally obtained evidence.
59
However, the Lance W. court held that federal law controlled and,
therefore, admitted the evidence.6' In reaching its decision, the
court applied traditional "rules of interpretation" to section 28.61
The court also reasoned that the voters' "intent," which it deduced
from an examination of the ballot pamphlet circulated prior to
election day, supported admission of the evidence.62
Lance W., a four to three decision, represented a compromise.
First, it took two and one-half years for the court to reach the issue
54. Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d at 904-05, 694 P.2d at 765-66, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 652-53 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). The -'vicarious standing" rule permits defendants to object to the introduction of
evidence obtained in violation of the rights of a third person. Il
55. Id at 880, 694 P.2d at 748, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 880-81, 694 P.2d at 747-48, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 634-35.
58. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (discussing the vicarious standing rule
with regard to privacy expectations).
59. Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d at 883, 694 P.2d at 749-50, 210 Cal. Rptr. 636-37 (1985). See
People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 761,290 P.2d 855, 857 (1955) (discussing California's vicarious
standing rule).
60. Id. at 891, 694 P.2d at 755, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 642. The Lance W. case was not the faust
time that the Supreme Court of California had addressed the continued viability of the vicarious
exclusionary rule. In 1965, the legislature adopted Evidence Code section 351 which states that
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible." CAL. EviD. CODE
§ 351 (West 1982). It was argued that section 351 repealed the vicarious exclusionary rule. The court
held that it did not, finding no legislative intent to repeal the rule. Kaplan v. Superior Court, 6 Cal.
3d 150, 158-59, 491 P.2d 1, 5-6, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649, 653-54 (1971).
61. Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d at 887-88, 694 P.2d at 753, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
62. Id. at 889-90 nn.9-11,694 P.2d at 754-55 nn.9-11,210 Cal. Rptr. at 641-42 nn.9-11.
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of whether section 28(d) was constitutional. Second, although the
court held that the seized marijuana could not be excluded in
accordance with federal law, the police officers' act of entering the
car remained illegal.63 However, the court undermined the
significance of the illegality of the police officers' act by holding
that the illicit nature does not render the evidence suppressible.
This caveat serves to preserve the last twenty years of California's
expansion of defendant rights beyond those dictated by the federal
constitution. Although the court will not exclude evidence seized
in compliance with federal law, but in violation of state law, the
court remains open to alternative remedies. Although Lance W. was
certainly a victory for Proposition 8, the court's opinion
demonstrates its reluctance to fully effectuate the intended purpose
of Proposition 8.
B. The May Debacle
Lance W. was the nadir of the Bird Court's interpretation of
Proposition 8. It was followed within weeks by People v. Castro
6 4
and People v. Fritz,65 two decisions which greatly undercut the
reach of the evidentiary provisions of Proposition 8. Castro and
Fritz both concern section 28(f) which provides that "[a]ny prior
felony conviction of any person in any criminal proceeding ...
shall subsequently be used without limitation for purposes of
impeachment or enhancement of sentence in any criminal
proceeding.
' 66
In Castro, pursuant to section 28(f), the trial court ruled that the
savings clause of section 28(d) was controlling over section
28(f). 67 Therefore, the court held, a trial court judge retained
discretionary power to exclude prior convictions if their admission
63. Id. at 886, 694 P.2d at 753, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 639. The court stated "[w]hat would have
been an unlawful search or seizure in this state before the passage of that initiative would be unlawful
today, and this is so even if it would pass muster under the federal Constitution." Id.
64. 38 Cal. 3d 301, 696 P.2d 111,211 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1985).
65. 40 Cal. 3d 227, 707 P.2d 833, 219 Cal. Rptr. 460 (1985).
66. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f).
67. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 305, 696 P.2d at 112, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
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would be substantially outweighed by "undue prejudice" pursuant
to section 352.68
The Castro court had to reconcile the language in sections
28(d) and (f). Section 28(f) provides that prior felony convictions
"shall" be used "without limitation.' '69 However, section 28(d)
provides that nothing in this "section" effects the court's
discretion under section 352.70 The trial court concluded that
section 28(d) controlled and accordingly permitted the defendant
accused of receiving stolen property to be impeached with prior
felony convictions of possession of heroin and possession of heroin
for sale.
71
A holding in Castro that the reference in section 28(d) to
"section" really meant subsection would have been equally
defensible. Despite the clear intent of Proposition 8 to allow the
admissibility of "all relevant evidence," the Castro court opted to
narrowly restrict its application. It is curious that given the
opportunity to allow more evidence to be admitted, the court chose
to allow less. That decision was contrary to the voters' purpose in
adopting Proposition 8, namely to strike a balance between
defendant and victim rights. The retention of section 352 discretion
for the admission of prior felony convictions does not further that
purpose. For that reason, Castro has been criticized.72
People v. Fritz concerned the use of prior convictions as a
means to enhance sentences.73 Section 28(f) provides that prior
felony convictions "shall" be used "without limitation for
purposes of... enhancement of sentence." 74 In Fritz, there was
no conflict with section 28(d). Nonetheless, the court, relying upon
68. Id
69. CA. CoNsr. art. I, § 28(f).
70. Id. § 28(d). See CAL. EvID. CODE § 352 (West 1982). Section 352 states in pertinent part:
[Mhe court in its discretion may exclude evidence ifits probative value is substantially outweighed
by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." Id.
71. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 305, 696 P.2d at 112-13, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 720 (1985).
72. See, e.g., Note, supra, note 23, at 540 n.1; Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 319-22, 696 P.2d 111,
122-23, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719, 730-32 (1985) (Grodin, J., concurring and dissenting) (criticizing the
courts holding in People v. Castro).
73. People v. Fritz, 40 Cal. 3d 227, 228, 707 P.2d 833, 833, 219 Cal. Rptr. 460, 461 (1985).
74. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f).
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a well-developed line of cases, held that a sentencing judge still
retained discretion to strike felony convictions pursuant to Penal
Code section 1385. 75 The court held that if the drafters of
Proposition 8 had intended to overrule this line of cases, they
would have done so explicitly.
76
Section 28(d) and the exclusionary rule met their greatest test
in the May cases.7 7 There were two May opinions. The first was
heard before the Bird Court.7 On rehearing, the second was heard
before the Lucas Court after the 1986 judicial vote.
79
In People v. May,8" the court considered whether statements
obtained in violation of the standards set forth in Miranda could be
used for the purposes of impeachment."1 Prior to the adoption of
Proposition 8, California law was clear in providing that statements
obtained in violation of Miranda warnings could not be used for
any purpose even if the statements were shown to otherwise be
voluntary on the ground that deciding the voluntariness issue would'
be too difficult.82 This rule was known as the Disbrow rule.
Moreover, even if the statements were found to be voluntary, a jury
75. Fritz, 40 Cal. 3d at 230-31, 707 P.2d at 834-35, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 461-62. Penal Code
section 1385 provides in relevant part: "'The judge or magistrate may, either of its own motion or
upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be
dismissed. The reason for the dismissal must be set forth in an order entered upon the minutes."
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385 (West 1982). Proposition 8 also added several sections to the Penal Code,
one of which was relevant in Fritz. Penal Code section 667 provides for five-year sentence
enhancements for defendants who have previously been convicted of a "serious felony." CAL. PENAL
CODE § 667(a) (West 1982). Section 667 also provides that a defendant "shall receive" a five year
enhancement for each such prior serious felony conviction. Id. Fritz analyzed both section 28(l) and
Penal Code section 667. Fritz, 40 Cal. 3d at 230-31, 707 P.2d at 835, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 462.
76. Fritz, 40 Cal. 3d at 230-31,707 P.2d at 834-35,219 Cal. Rptr. at 461. Justice Lucas (now
Chief Justice Lucas) wrote in dissent: "Once again, through a strained and unrealistic statutory
construction, the majority has thwarted the obvious intent of the framers of, and voters for,
Proposition 8." Id. at 233, 707 P.2d at 837, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 464 (Lucas, J. dissenting).
77. People v. May, 43 Cal. 3d 436, 729 P.2d 778, 233 Cal. Rptr. 344 (1987), vacated by,
People v. May, 44 Cal. 3d 309, 748 P.2d 307, 243 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1988).
78. 43 Cal. 3d 436, 729 P.2d 778, 233 Cal. Rptr. 344 (1987).
79. 44 Cal. 3d 309, 748 P.2d 307, 243 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1988).
80. May, 43 Cal. 3d 436, 729 P.2d 778, 233 Cal. Rptr. 344.
81. Id., 729 P.2d at 780, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
82. People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 124, 545 P.2d 272, 287, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 375
(1976) (Wright, CJ., concurring), overruled by May, 44 Cal. 3d 309, 748 P.2d 307, 243 Cal. Rptr.
369.
1115
Pacific Law Journal/ VoL 23
would have difficulty following a limiting instruction."3 More
importantly, the court feared that the admission of illegally
obtained evidence for impeachment purposes would undermine
what it saw as the purpose of the exclusionary rule, which was to
protect the integrity of the courts, and might encourage law
enforcement to violate the law.84 Federal law was just the
opposite. Statements given prior to a Miranda warning could be
used under federal law to impeach a defendant so long as the
statements were shown to be otherwise voluntary.8" However, the
Supreme Court of California held that the federal law on the issue
was not binding authority in any California state prosecution. 6
Following the adoption of Proposition 8, the May court was
faced with the task of determining the effect of section 28(d) on
the Disbrow rule. To do that, the court examined how the savings
clause would effect Disbrow." Thus, the court held, pursuant to
Ramona R., that the savings clause of section 28(d) clearly applied
to privileges, including the privilege against self-incrimination. 8
The Attorney General argued that while the right not to
testimonially incriminate oneself remained, in such a situation, the
remedy of exclusion was abrogated by section 28(d).89 The court
responded that the savings clause language was clear, that the
ballot pamphlets indicated nothing to the contrary and, most
importantly, that the remedy of exclusion was indivisibly
appurtenant to the privilege itself." Thus, the Disbrow rule
remained intact.9'
In 1986, Chief Justice Bird and Justices Grodin and Reynoso
were not confirmed and three new justices were appointed by
Governor Deukmejian with Justice Lucas being elevated to Chief
83. Id at 112, 545 P.2d at 279, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
84. Id. at 111-13, 545 P.2d at 279, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 366-67.
85. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971).
86. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d at 113, 545 P.2d at 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
87. People v. May, 43 Cal. 3d 436, 729 P.2d 778, 783-85,233 Cal. Rptr. 344, 358-59 (1987).
88. Id, 729 P.2d at 785, 233 Cal.Rptr. at 350.
89. Id., 729 P.2d at 782, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
90. Id. (stating that "the privilege against self-incrimination ... necessarily confers a right
to exclude").
91. Id, 729 P.2d at 787-88, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
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Justice.' Subsequently, People v. May was granted a petition for
rehearing. This time, Disbrow was overruled.9' The court held that
statements obtained in violation of Miranda could be used to
impeach so long as they were shown to be otherwise voluntary.94
In reaching its decision, the court adopted the right/remedy
distinction urged by the Attorney General in the first May case.
95
The court reasoned that while the savings clause did indeed
preserve the California rules on the privilege against self-
incrimination, the clause said nothing about the remedy of
exclusion.96 The court rejected the idea that the exclusionary
remedy was appurtenant to the right.97
It is difficult to distinguish People v. May from Ramona R. v.
Superior Court. Ramona R. simply held that the savings clause
exempted the privilege against self-incrimination from section 28 (d)
and that use immunity had to be granted to juveniles at 707
hearings.9" That case made no right/remedy distinction. Suddenly,
in May, the court held that use immunity was appurtenant to the
privilege against self-incrimination and had nothing to do with the
exclusionary remedy.' The May court attempted to distinguish
Ramona R. on the ground that 707 testimony was legislatively
compelled and that "legislatively compelled testimony cannot be
used against the testifier for any purpose under the federal
Constitution."" However, Ramona R. was based on the state
constitution.'' In effect, May based Ramona . on the federal
constitution ex post facto and proceeded to read a right/remedy
distinction into Ramona R where it had not existed before.
92. L.A. Times, Nov. 5, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
93. People v. May, 44 Cal. 3d 309, 315, 748 P.2d 307, 310, 243 Cal. Rptr. 369, 372 (1988).
94. Il at 319, 748 P.2d at 313, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
95. Id at 315, 748 P.2d at 310, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
96. Id at 316-18, 748 P.2d at 311-12, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 373-74.
97. Id. at 319-20, 748 P.2d at 313, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
98. Ramona R. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 802, 804,693 P.2d 789,790,210 Cal. Rptr. 204,
205 (1985).
99. May, 44 Cal. 3d at 317-18, 748 P.2d at 312, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
100. Id at 317, 748 P.2d at 312, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
101. Ramona, 37 Cal. 3d at 804, 693 P.2d at 790, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
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C. Result: Confusion, in the District Courts of Appeal
The May decisions illustrate the extent to which the Lucas
Court had to struggle with the Bird Court Proposition 8 decisions
in an effort to restore force to the Proposition. The period of
transition produced a significant amount of confusion in the district
courts of appeal."° This is illustrated by People v. Celaya'0 3
and People v. Rooney.'
In People v. Celaya, the Sixth District Court of Appeal
addressed the question of whether a "non-Mirandized" confession
taints a later "Mirandized" confession.' 5 In that case, the
defendant was visiting a sheriffs office with his wife on an
unrelated matter.106 A sergeant recognized the defendant as
matching the description of a suspect in an auto burglary.0 7 He
told the defendant he wanted to talk to him and directed him to an
interview room.' In the interview room, the defendant was
vague as to his involvement in the crime."t 9 The sergeant told the
defendant that the investigation could proceed "the hard way or the
easy way," later indicating in the suppression hearing that the
"hard way" meant through arrest, booking, and a line-up. 110 The
defendant then made certain admissions."' Following these
admissions, the defendant was given his Miranda warnings, which
102. Following the May opinion the Lucas court upheld federal law in several other cases. See,
e.g., People v. Luttenberger, 50 Cal. 3d 1, 18, 784 P.2d 633, 644, 265 Cal. Rptr. 690, 701 (1990)
(holding that the federal standards applied concerning the burden of proof in a motion to traverse a
search warrant); People v. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 1083, 767 P.2d 619, 641, 255 Cal. Rptr. 352,
374 (1989) (holding that the prosecution could bolster a witness' reputation even before that
reputation was attacked); People v. Johnson, 47 Cal. 3d 1194, 1233, 767 P.2d 1047, 1065, 255 Cal.
Rptr. 569, 587 (1989) (holding that the federal standards on the duty to preserve evidence controlled
in California); People v. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d 63, 70-71, 775 P.2d 1042, 1047, 260 Cal. Rptr. 273,
278 (1989) (holding that the federal rule of a preponderance of the evidence applied in determining
the voluntariness of statements).
103. 191 Cal. App. 3d 665, 236 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1987).
104. 175 Cal. App. 3d 634, 221 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1985).
105. Celaya, 191 Cal. App. 3d at 670-71, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
106. Id. at 668, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 668-79, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 490-91.
110. Id. at 668-69, 236 Cal. Rplr. at 490.
111. Id. at 669-70, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 490-91.
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he waived."' The defendant then repeated many of his
incriminating statements.
113
In California, prior to the adoption of Proposition 8, a non-
Mirandized confession was presumed to taint a later Mirandized
confession."' The prosecution had the burden of showing that the
first confession was not coerced."' In the federal system, on the
other hand, in Oregon v. Elstad,116 the Supreme Court of the
United States had held that a non-Mirandized confession is not
presumed to taint a later Mirandized confession unless the defense
is able to show that the first confession had been coerced." 7
To determine the effect of section 28(d) on the California rule,
the Sixth District Court of Appeal took an unusual tack. First, the
court noted that the applicability of section 28(d) had been raised
by the Attorney General and that it was in issue given the date of
the facts." 8 The court then held that the sergeant's use of the
"easy or hard way" language indicated that the first confession
was coerced." 9
The court could have stopped right there. If the first statement
was coerced, then under the Supreme Court of the United States'
Elstad opinion, neither the first nor the later statements was
admissible. But that is not what the court did. Instead of directly
deciding the application of section 28(d) to the facts, the court held
that if section 28(d) did apply, then Elstad was controlling and the
evidence was excluded. 2 ' The court also said that if section
28(d) did not apply, then the evidence was not admissible based on
California law and independent state grounds.12 ' Nowhere in the
court's opinion is there a statement of the law upon which the
112. Id. at 669, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
113. Id. at 669-70, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 490-91.
114. Id. at 670-71, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
115. Id. at 671, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
116. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
117. Id at 307.
118. Celaya, 191 Cal. App. 3d at 673, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
119. Id at 672, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 492.
120. Id. at 674, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
121. Id.
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decision was based. The court did not decide if section 28(d)
applied.
The reason for the court's failure to decide the applicability of
section 28(d) is historical. At the time of its decision, the first May
decision had been granted a rehearing." If May was left intact,
then California law would have applied to the Celaya facts. If May
was vacated, as it was, section 28(d) applied and federal law was
controlling. Due to the uncertainty of the Supreme Court of
California's direction on section 28(d), the district court of appeal
adopted a holding without determining the applicable law."'
While uncertainty marked the Celaya opinion, confusion was
evident in the second district court of appeal's decision in People
v. Rooney,124 concerning trash can searches. In Rooney, the
defendant lived in a 28-unit apartment complex in West
Hollywood.' 25 In the garage of the complex was a communal
trash bin in which all the residents dumped their trash.126 Police
officers had information that the defendant was conducting an
illegal wagering scheme out of his apartment.127 In order to
obtain information to support a search warrant to search the
defendant's apartment, the officers searched the communal trash
bin for anything indicating that bets were being taken. 12' Near the
bottom of the bin, they found a brown paper shopping bag
containing mail addressed to the defendant and tally sheets of
wagers on professional football games. 129 A warrant was
ultimately obtained on the basis of the tally sheets.130
The Rooney court was faced with the task of determining
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy existed in trash placed
in a communal receptacle. 131 In a similar case, People v.
122. Id. at 674-75, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 494 (Brauer, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 675, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 494 (Brauer, I., concurring).
124. 175 Cal. App. 3d 634, 221 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1985).





130. Id. at 640, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 52.
131. lit at 641, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 53.
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Krivda,132 the Supreme Court of California found a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the trash cans left by a family on a
sidewalk for pick-up "until the trash had lost its identity and
meaning by becoming part of a large conglomeration of trash
elsewhere. 1
133
The Rooney court extended Krivda, finding fourth amendment
protection in trash placed in a communal bin.13 Despite the vast
majority of authority to the contrary, the court noted that in the
absence of a Supreme Court of the United States case squarely on
point, federal decisions were not binding upon a state court.135
However, three years later, in another California case, the Supreme
Court of the United States found no fourth amendment protection
in communal trash bins or even in trash cans left at a single-family
home, thus effectively overruling both Krivda and Rooney.136
Rooney demonstrates what little impact Proposition 8 has had
on some district courts of appeal. Rooney was decided after the
enactment of Proposition 8, as well as after Lance W. was handed
down. However, the Rooney court did not see Proposition 8 as a
barrier to the extension of Krivda. Despite the voters' clear
intention to disfavor the exclusion of relevant evidence, with little
direction from the Supreme Court of California on how to interpret
this command and the absence of a Supreme Court of the United
States' decision on point, the Rooney court felt free to disobey
Proposition 8 entirely and applied section 28(d) narrowly.
132. 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971).
133. Id. at 366, 486 P.2d at 1268, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
134. Rooney, 175 Cal. App 3d at 646, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
135. Id. at 644, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 55. See generally United States v. Sumpter, 669 F. 2d 1215,
1221 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Crowell, 586 F.2d 1020, 1024 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Shelby, 573 F.2d 971, 973-74 (7th
Cir. 1978); Magda v. Benson, 536 F.2d 111, 112-13 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Mustone, 469
F.2d 970, 972 (1st Cir. 1972); United States v. Dzialak, 441 F.2d 212, 215 (2nd Cir. 1971); United
States v. Minker, 312 F.2d 632, 634-35 (3rd Cir. 1962) (federal cases holding that no fourth
amendment protection existed for trash bins, communal or otherwise).
136. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 36 (1988).
1121
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 23
III. PROPOSITION 8 APPLIES WHERE
THE SuPR/ME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
HAS NOT SPOKEN.
The Rooney case raised an issue that is certain to arise again
and again in the California courts: If the Supreme Court of the
United States has not decided an issue in which the exclusionary
rule may apply, what role, if any, will Proposition 8 play?
To hold that section 28(d) applies only in those situations in
which the Supreme Court of the United States has directly spoken,
as the Rooney court seems to have believed, frustrates the purpose
of Proposition 8. Proposition 8 was intended to favor the rights of
victims and the effective prosecution of crime in general. It was not
intended to be limited to issues previously addressed by the
Supreme Court of the United States. Proposition 8 reflected a new
criminal justice balance towards victim rights, not simply the
adoption of a collection of legal rules. It had meaning when it was
adopted and continues to have meaning ten years after its adoption.
When the Supreme Court of the United States has not directly
addressed an issue in which the exclusionary rule may apply and
no clear analogy may be drawn from other cases, the California
courts should favor an interpretation allowing evidence to be
admitted. The rights of criminal defendants cannot be ignored.
However, when there is no clear basis in law for favoring the
defendant, in light of Proposition 8 the balance should shift towards
the admission of relevant evidence. Two hypothetical situations are
examined to illustrate what this means upon application.
A. Removal of Identification During Detention
Hypothetical: Officer Jones observed a man, Smith, staggering
as he walked along the sidewalk. Jones lawfully detained Smith
suspecting that he was publicly intoxicated. Officer Jones asked
Smith to identify himself. Smith refused. Officer Jones then
reached into Smith's back pocket and removed Smith's wallet.
While trying to locate identification, Jones found a small glassine
bag of cocaine. Is the cocaine suppressible? If so, would it be
1122
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suppressible if there was a statute requiring a person to identify
him or herself upon a request from a peace officer?
Neither the Supreme Court of California or the Supreme Court
of the United States has directly addressed the issue raised in the
hypothetical. On two occasions, the Supreme Court of the United
States specifically reserved the issue.'37
In Terry v. Ohio3' the Supreme Court of the United States
made clear that it placed a premium upon personal security. The
Court held that a pat-down search "must be limited to that which
is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to
harm the officer or others nearby ..... ,1
In other areas of the law, the Court has retreated from its
position that a search during a lawful detention must be purely
weapons-based. After a lawful stop of an automobile, officers may
open the door of the vehicle or even enter the vehicle to obtain the
identity of the vehicle when the vehicle identification number
(VIN) is not otherwise visible." Ships at sea may be stopped
without cause and boarded by appropriate customs officials for the
purpose of examining the ship's manifest.' Both of these areas,
however, involve regulated methods of transportation in which
expectations of privacy may be lessened.
The case most directly analogous to the hypothetical is Hayes
v. Florida.14 In Hayes, the defendant was suspected of a number
of burglaries and rapes. 43 Officers went to the defendant's home
and asked that he come with them to the station house to be
137. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 53 n.3 (1979) ("We need not decide whether an
individual may be punished for refusing to identify himself in the context of a lawful investigatory
stop which satisfies Fourth Amendment requirements."); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 362
n.10 (1983) ("Because we affirmed the judgment of the court below on this ground, we find it
unnecessary to decide the other questions raised by the parties.... The remaining issues raised by
the parties include whether Section 647(e) implicates Fourth Amendment concerns, whether the
individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his identity when he is detained lawfully under
Terry, whether the requirement that an individual identify himself during a Terry stop violates the
Fifth Amendment protections against compelled testimony . .
138. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
139. Id. at 24-25.
140. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114 (1986).
141. United States v. Villamonte-Marques, 462 U.S. 579, 580 (1983).
142. 470 U.S. 811 (1985).
143. Id. at 812.
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fingerprinted.'" When the defendant refused, the officers said
they would arrest him if he did not comply. 145 The defendant
reluctantly went with the officers, stating that he would rather
comply than be arrested.
146
The Hayes Court accepted the lower court's findings that the
trip to the station was without the defendant's consent. 47 Without
consent, the Court said, a reasonable suspicion was insufficient to
compel the defendant to go to the station for fingerprinting. 4 '
Thus, the fingerprints were suppressed.
149
In dicta, the Hayes Court indicated that its decision did not
imply that a brief detention in the field for the purposes of
fingerprinting, where there is only reasonable suspicion not
amounting to probable cause, is necessarily impermissible under the
fourth amendment. 5 ° Further, the Court noted that "[i]f there are
articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that a person has
committed a criminal offense, that person may be stopped in order
to identify him, to question him, or to detain him briefly while
attempting to obtain additional information."'
151
Although it may be urged that to permit the type of search
presented in the hypothetical would permit law enforcement to
search a purse, luggage, or backpack as a pretext for finding
identification, it must be remembered that such a search would only
be conducted after a reasonable suspicion has arisen that the person
has committed or is committing a crime and after the person has
failed to identify himself or herself. It is difficult to reconcile why
a lawfully detained person may be fingerprinted, but that person's
wallet or purse or other item where identification might reasonably
be kept may not be removed. It is debatable whether such a
procedure is more invasive than fingerprinting. Even if it is, the
144. IM at 813.
145. Id at 812.
146. Id
147. Id. at 814 n.1.
148. Id. at 815-16.
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Court's language in Hayes suggests that it may still be within
Fourth Amendment standards of "reasonableness" when based
upon a lawful detention and refusal to supply identification. The
courts of two states, 152 and two California district courts of
appeal153 have permitted the removal of identification during a
detention on the ground that to hold otherwise would render the
Terry-stop investigatory function null.
B. Nighttime Service of Search Warrants
Hypothetical: Narcotics Officer Jones goes to Judge Smith to
obtain a search warrant for a residence. The affidavit adequately
sets forth the facts to support probable cause to believe narcotics
will be found at the residence and also describes with sufficient
particularity the places to be searched and items to be seized. Judge
Smith signs the warrant but does not authorize nighttime service of
the warrant. The affidavit sets forth no facts indicating why
nighttime service is needed. The warrant is served just after
midnight. Later, in a motion to suppress evidence, Officer Jones
sets forth facts indicating why nighttime service was needed.
Should the evidence be suppressed?
This hypothetical raises the issue of whether something more
than probable cause that the items sought will be found in the
residence is needed in a warrant declaration if a warrant is to be
served at night. California Penal Code section 1533 clearly requires
that "good cause" for nighttime service be shown in addition to
probable cause, 54 but neither the Supreme Court of the United
152. See New Jersey v. Wilcox, 180 NJ. Super. 452,435 A.2d 569,571 (NJ. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1981); Wisconsin v. Flynn, 92 Wis. 2d 427, 285 N.W.2d 710, 717 (1980).
i53. See People v. Loudermilk, 195 Cal. App. 3d 996, 1001, 241 Cal. Rptr. 208, 210 (1987);
People v. Long, 189 Cal. App. 3d 77, 88, 234 Cal. Rptr. 271, 277 (1987). But see People v. Smith,
34 Cal. 3d 251,271-72, 667 P.2d 149, 159-61, 193 Cal. Rptr. 692, 702-04, (1983) (holding that the
removal of a wallet was invalid and that Proposition 8 was not to be applied retroactively).
154. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1533 (West 1982). Section 1533 provides:
Upon a showing of good cause, the magistrate may, in his or her discretion, insert a
direction in a search warrant that it may be served at anytime of the day or night. In the
absence of such a direction, the warrant shall be served only between the hours of 7 a.m.
and 10 pam. When establishing 'good cause' under this section, the magistrate shall
consider the safety of the peace officer serving the warrant and the safety of the public
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States nor the Supreme Court of California has said whether such
a special showing is a fourth amendment requirement.
On the one occasion in which the Supreme Court of the United
States did speak to nighttime service of search warrants, in
Gooding v. United States, 55 the Court dealt with the issue of
whether any special showing was needed as a matter of statutory
interpretation.156 Under federal statute, a United States judge or
magistrate may issue a warrant if he or she "is satisfied there
exists probable cause to believe that grounds exist for the warrant
and for its service at such time.' 157 The Court stated that the
statute required "no special showing for a nighttime search, other
than a showing that the contraband is likely to be on the property
or person to be searched at that time." '158 The fourth amendment
issue was not reached by the Court.159 In an older case, however,
Justice Harlan wrote that "it is difficult to imagine a more severe
invasion of privacy than the nighttime intrusion into a private
home.' 160
What is at issue in this hypothetical is the manner in which the
search and seizure is executed, not the basic probable cause
supporting the search and seizure. The specific language of the
fourth amendment is important: "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause. .. ."'61 The
relevant question is whether "probable cause" defines the
reasonableness requirement or whether reasonableness has meaning
separate and apart from the probable cause requirement.
By analogy, case law indicates that "reasonableness" does
have a meaning separate from the probable cause requirement. For
as a valid basis for nighttime endorsements.
Id.
155. 416 U.S. 430 (1974).
156. Id. at 431.
157. 21 U.S.C.A. § 879 (West 1981).
158. Gooding, 416 U.S. at 445.
159. Id. at 458.
160. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958).
161. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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example, in Schmerber v. California,62 which concerned a blood
sample drawn from a person driving under the influence of alcohol,
the issue of whether there was probable cause to believe the
defendant's blood contained alcohol was not contested.16 Rather,
the issue addressed was the reasonableness of the manner and
method in which the blood sample was drawn.' 6 In United States
v. Montoya de Hernandez,65 a suspect was stopped as she was
deboarding a South American flight." She was detained for
sixteen hours to observe whether she was smuggling narcotics in
her alimentary canal.1 67 The central issue was not whether
"reasonable suspicion" for the detention existed, but rather
whether its duration was reasonable. 16' Regarding the execution
of an arrest warrant, the Supreme Court of the United States has
held that "[t]he method of entering the home may offend federal
constitutional standards of reasonableness and therefore vitiate the
legality of an accompanying search.' ' 169 Thus, it appears by
analogy that, in addition to probable cause, it must be shown that
the service of the warrant at night was reasonable.
That does not end the inquiry. It must next be determined
whether the reasonableness of executing the search warrant at night
must be put forth in the search warrant affidavit. By analogy, the
law concerning knock-notice requirements is instructive.
Section 1531 of the California Penal Code provides that, in
execution of a warrant, an "officer may break open any outer or
inner door... if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is
refused admittance."' 170 Case law indicates that compliance with
this section may be excused for good cause. The Supreme Court of
California has held that "[t]his section requiring notice of authority
and purpose does not compel application of the exclusionary rule
162. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
163. Id. at 758.
164. Id. at 759.
165. 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
166. Id. at 532.
167. Id. at 533.
168. Id. at 542.
169. Ker v. State of California, 374 U.S. 23, 38 (1963).
170. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1531 (West 1982).
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if specific facts known to the officer before his entry were
sufficient to support his good faith belief that compliance would
increase his peril, frustrate arrest, or permit the destruction of
evidence.''. Nothing in the case law indicates that good cause
for noncompliance, even when known at the time the warrant is
approved, must be set forth in the warrant affidavit. It might be
urged that permitting justification for nighttime service to be set
forth at the suppression hearing would encourage fabrication, but
the same might be said of excuse from knock-notice requirements.
The fourth amendment provides that "no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause."' 72 However, nighttime service may be
folded into the reasonableness requirement which may be decided
later.
Two federal circuit courts have permitted an after-the-fact
examination of the reasonableness of the nighttime service of
search warrants. 73 One California district court of appeal has
done the same.'74
In both of the hypotheticals set forth, arguments can be made
on either side for the admission or exclusion of the evidence.
Argument by analogy to other Supreme Court of the United States'
cases leads only to other debatable arguments. Ultimately, the
resolution of these issues, and other "open" issues like them, will
involve a policy decision between the rights of the criminal
defendant and the ability of the state to effectively prosecute crime.
The voters who adopted Proposition 8 made a policy decision
that in balancing defendant and victim rights, the admission of
relevant evidence is to be favored. Accordingly, even if an analysis
of the hypothetical issues raised or similar issues indicates by
analogy that the evidence should be excluded, courts should
171. Parsley v. Supierior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 934,938,513 P.2d 611,613, 109 Cal. Rptr. 563,565
(1973).
172. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
173. See United States v. Searp, 586 F.2d 1117, 1126 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Ravich,
421 F.2d 1196, 1201 (2nd Cir. 1970) (permitting an after-the-fact examination of the reasonableness
of nighttime service of search warrants).
174. See Rodriguez v. Superior Court Tulare County, 199 Cal. App. 3d 1453,1467-69,245 Cal.
Rptr. 617, 624-25 (1988) (permitting an after-the-fact examination of the reasonableness of the
nighttime service of search warrants).
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nonetheless weigh in the balance the general policy reflected in
Proposition 8 that relevant evidence is not to be excluded.
Proposition 8 has a role to play in all cases in which the
exclusionary rule is at issue, not only those to which the Supreme
Court of the United States has directly spoken. In these
hypotheticals, with Proposition 8 weighed into the balance, the
evidence should be admitted.
IV. CONCLUSION
The purpose of the voters in adopting Proposition 8 was to
strike a new balance between defendant rights and the effective
prosecution of crime. Though this point has not been seriously
challenged, the point has never been fully embraced by any court.
Voter intent, a liberal interpretation of constitutional provisions,
and recognition of Proposition 8 as a remedial statute, are all
methods which can be employed by the courts to effectuate the
purpose of Proposition 8.
The purpose of Proposition 8 should be articulated and
implemented in all cases in which criminal defendant and victim
rights are juxtaposed. The most active areas in the balance of
defendant rights and the ability of the state to effectively prosecute
crime are section 28(d) and the exclusionary rule. With regard to
the exclusionary rule, the purpose of Proposition 8 should be
furthered in all cases involving the exclusionary rule, not just in
those limited areas which the Supreme Court of the United States
has addressed. Proposition 8 was not intended to have a mere "bit
part" in our court system, appearing briefly in 1982 to switch the
California rules to those adopted by the Supreme Court of the
United States. Proposition 8, at its tenth anniversary, has an
important, on-going role to play in our courts. That role should be
articulated and effectuated in every case involving the balance of
defendant rights and the effective prosecution of crime.
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